University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Travel and Tourism Research Association: Advancing Tourism Research Globally

Safeguarding Caribbean lives and livelihoods for regenerative
tourism: Surveying the stringency-resiliency nexus in small island
tourism economies
Ryan R. Peterson
Central Bank of Aruba

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/ttra

Peterson, Ryan R., "Safeguarding Caribbean lives and livelihoods for regenerative tourism: Surveying the
stringency-resiliency nexus in small island tourism economies" (2022). Travel and Tourism Research
Association: Advancing Tourism Research Globally. 94.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/ttra/2022/researchabstract/94

This Event is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Travel and Tourism Research Association: Advancing Tourism Research Globally by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

Safeguarding Caribbean lives and livelihoods for regenerative tourism:
Surveying the stringency-resiliency nexus in small island tourism economies
Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic and the government measures to contain its spread have taken a heavy
toll on the Caribbean, affecting both livelihoods and lives (Murphy et al., 2020). Economically,
Caribbean small island economies contracted by at least 10 percent in 2020 (IMF, 2021). Although
governments in the Caribbean acted swiftly to safeguard lives and contain the spread of COVID19 (Murphy et al., 2020), they faced a clear and present economic dilemma in the wake of the
COVID-19 pandemic and the self-imposed government stringency measures, i.e., a halt to foreign
exchange earnings and economic activities resulting in severe loss of jobs and income (OECD,
2020; IMF, 2021; WB, 2021). Recently, the World Bank (2021) concluded that governments face
an unavoidable tradeoff between saving lives or protecting livelihoods; a sentiment that also seems
to resonate across the Caribbean (IMF, 2020; Murphy et al., 2020; OECD, 2020).
Although governments implemented diverse interventions, with different degrees of stringency
and speed, these control measures imposed substantial economic costs, including increased fiscal,
financial, and monetary pressures, hence affecting economic resiliency (Curdia, 2020; IMF, 2020;
Harjes et al., 2021; Kongsamut et al., 2021; Murphy et al., 2020). In essence, the COVID-19
pandemic resulted in an economic crisis through two shock transmission channels, i.e., the loss of
lives and productivity from infections and mobility control measures, in addition to the shortfall
in financial flows and foreign exchange earnings from trade and tourism service exports (Mooney
& Zegarra, 2020; Murphy et al., 2020).
However, while control measures, such as national lockdowns and strict shelter in place measures
were relatively effective in controlling the spread in some SITES, others experienced a rise in
COVID-19 cases despite implementing government measures (Asahi et al., 2021; IMF, 2020;
Murphy et al., 2020; OECD, 2020). Thus, whereas lockdowns halted the economy, they were not
effective enough to reduce the spread of the virus (OECD, 2020). In the aftermath of the COVID19 pandemic, this catch-22 situation continues to play out across the Caribbean as many struggle
to restore their post-pandemic island economy and develop tourism in a regenerative manner.

Caribbean SITES indeed continue to face an existential conundrum between safeguarding
livelihoods and saving lives in the short-term, in addition to balancing short-term and mediumterm financial and fiscal risks (Deb et al., 2020; Murphy et al., 2020). Recently, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF, 2021) concluded that Caribbean SITES risk a COVID-19 economic longhaul due to the lasting scarring in terms, e.g., structural unemployment, health costs, surging fiscal
deficits, and a post-pandemic debt trap. The virus may indeed be fading, but its legacy is likely to
linger across the Caribbean over the medium term (Mooney & Zegarra, 2020).
The purpose of this study is to explore government COVID-19 stringency measures taken by a
select sample of Caribbean SITES, and, subsequently, analyze the dynamic relationship with
economic resilience as measured by the level of net foreign assets and the development in
international reserves during the course of 2020. Building forth on recent COVID-19 economic
impact studies, this paper describes the specific SITE case of Aruba and surveys the developments
in international reserves, government stringency measures, residential mobility, capital controls,
and fiscal support during 2020. Specifically, this study explores the short-run nexus between
government stringency measures and international reserves, and questions the popular belief that
there is a tradeoff between preserving livelihoods and saving lives. The paper concludes with
several directions for future research as well as policy recommendations.
Literature Review
For small island tourism economies (SITES) in the Caribbean, the export of tourism services is
the main source of income and foreign exchange earnings. In some Caribbean SITES, tourism
services account for more than 50 percent of GDP and at least 70 percent of foreign exchange
earnings (see Table 1). Besides generating employment and (tax) revenues, tourism foreign
exchange earnings are integral to maintaining monetary stability by managing required
international reserves to meet financial obligations, foster confidence, and fend against foreign
exchange fall-outs and economic shocks (Carasco et al., 2013; Harjes et al., 2021; Mooney &
Zegarra, 2020). Thus, the adequacy of international reserves are pivotal to strengthening
economic resilience.
Caribbean SITES heed a foreign exchange requisite for shielding against external shocks and
safeguarding confidence. Tourism-dependent economies hinge largely on foreign exchange
earnings from the export of tourism services (IMF, 2020; Mooney & Zegarra, 2020). These
foreign exchange earnings are integral to support an economy’s international reserves and, thus,
maintain monetary stability, especially in Caribbean SITES that enjoy a fixed-exchange regime
under the purview of a central bank or monetary authority. In general, international reserves are
defined as external assets that are readily available to and controlled by the monetary authorities
for meeting balance of payments financing needs, for serving as a basis for foreign borrowing,
for intervening in exchange rate markets to affect the currency exchange rate, and for maintaining
confidence in the (domestic) currency and the economy (IMF, 2020). In the case of Caribbean
SITES with fixed or pegged exchange regimes, international reserves are used by central banks
to maintain the external value of their currency at a fixed level. Reserves are a critical liquidity
and generally associated with lower crisis risks as well as policy responses to external sector
shocks for mitigating the adverse effects (IMF, 2020).

Table 1. Stylized indicators of select small island tourism economies (CBA, 2021; Hale et al.,
2021; IMF, 2021; Mooney & Zegarra, 2020; WTTC, 2021).
Small Island
Tourism Economy

Population
density

Aruba
Antigua & Barbuda
The Bahamas
Barbados
Dominica
Grenada
St. Kitts & Nevis
St. Lucia
Mean
Standard deviation

638.8
220.7
38.9
667.5
95.7
329.4
203.2
299.7
311.7
231.5

Tourism
export
receipts (% of
Current
Account; Ave.
2015-2019)
77
81
75
41
76
83
63
81
72.1
14.0

Direct
contribution
of tourism to
GDP (%; Ave.
2015-2019)

Real GDP
growth
2020 (%)

Current
Account
balance
2020 (% of
GDP)

Net
Foreign
Assets (Δ%
20192020)

Government Debt
(Δ% 20192020)

Total
COVID-19
cases (# of
infected
people)

27.6
13.1
19.2
13.1
12.3
6.9
6.6
15.6
14.3
6.8

-22.3
-17.3
-16.3
-17.6
-10.4
-13.5
-18.7
-18.9
-17.3
3.6

-12.7
-16.3
-17.6
-7.4
-18.8
-17.2
-8.1
-16.3
-14.3
4.4

+23.3
-20.5
+38.2
+36.5
+6.1
+24.2
+3.3
-11.3
+11.8
19.2

+44.8
+21.2
+17.5
+29.6
+11.6
+10.9
+9.2
+24.3
+20.1
11.5

11,108
1263
12,342
4,043
191
161
341
5,216
4333.1
4940.1

Early March 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic reared its head in the Caribbean, not only were
lives at stake, but also livelihoods, especially for those depending directly and indirectly on
tourism services for their income (IMF, 2020). In response to the dual demands of health safety
and financial stability (Cross et al., 2020; Mooney & Zegarra, 2020), Caribbean governments
resorted to implementing several non-pharmaceutical interventions (Murphy et al., 2020),
including a mix of, e.g., public health, fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange policy controls (see
Table 2).
Public health measures limit residential mobility to contain viral spread and infections, whereas
monetary and capital control measures provide (additional) liquidity, and stem the outflow of
international reserves by limiting capital outflow transactions (Achuo, 2020; Cross et al., 2021;
Harjes et al., 2021; Kongsamut et al., 2021;). Likewise, fiscal measures provide liquidity to
business and/or households in the form of, e.g., credit guarantees, term funding, repayment
moratoria, and employee wage subsidies (Kongsamut et al., 2021). The latter fiscal measures are,
however, largely contingent upon the available fiscal space, and may, consequently, result in
increased foreign borrowing causing increased fiscal deficits and debt levels in the medium term.
In terms of mitigating the negative effect of the health shock transmission channel, previous
studies indicate that, in general, government stringency measures were relatively effective in
containing the widespread diffusion of the corona virus, despite the surge of several subsequent
contagion waves (Achuo, 2020; Deb et al., 2020). The preliminary evidence suggests that targeted
stringency policies can minimize both economic losses and deaths (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2020).
While early government stringency measures helped to slow down the pandemic, over time their
effectiveness wore off due to numerous factors, including behavioral dynamics (i.e., residential
mobility behaviors, non-compliance with stringency guidelines, and institutional distrust) and
structural factors (i.e., high population density, early reopening of the economy, and weak
institutional capacity) (IMF, 2020; OECD, 2020).
Nevertheless, Murphy et al. (2020) indicate that stringent controls and, specifically, the early
timing and longevity of controls were instrumental in the COVID-19 containment in Caribbean
small island economies. Likewise, Cross et al. (2020) report that timing and duration were
fundamental in controlling the spread of COVID-19; governments which responded to the

pandemic faster and held on longer to control measures saw greater reductions in viral
transmission. However, these countries also reported more severe economic contractions ranging
from -8 percent to -15 percent (Cross et al., 2020). Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2020) reach similar
conclusions and show that non-pharmaceutical interventions led to a decline of, on average, 11
percent in economic activities. They conclude that the sooner stringency controls are
implemented, the better the economic and health outcomes (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2020).
Similar magnitudes of output loss – ranging from -6 percent to -20 percent – are reported for
Latin America and the Caribbean (IMF, 2020). Mooney & Zegarra (2020) present the case for
economic losses in the Caribbean and conclude that the fallout from tourism flows has a
significant negative impact on output, ranging from -4.6 percent to -19 percent in SITES. Asahi
et al. (2021) indicate that early adoption of lockdowns in Latin America are associated with a
drop of 10 percent to 15 percent in local economic activities. Alternatively, Ueda et al. (2021)
report that less aggressive measures are associated with less economic contraction.
Table 2. Sample of policy measures and interventions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic
(Murphy et al., 2020; Curdia, 2020; Harjes et al., 2021; Kongsamut et al., 2021).

Foreign exchange
intervention
Reduce policy rates and
reserve requirements
Liquidity support to
financial institutions

Fiscal
Measures

Foreign borrowing

Border health checks and
controls
Full or partial border closure
(travel bubbles and specific
flight suspensions)

Monetary, FX and
Financial measures

Accommodative
monetary policy

Mobility into country

Public Health measures
(non-pharmaceutical)

Emergency liquidity
assistance

Close or limit business
services
Close educational and social
service organizations
Social distancing and
mandatory use health masks
in public

Provide credit guarantees,
term funding and/or
payment moratoria
Capital flow management
of outflows to ease
pressures on international
reserves
Restrictions on residents’
investments and transfers
abroad
Minimum holdings by nonresidents
Business restrictions on
outgoing capital
transactions

Expenditure
management

Limit public gatherings

Capital & FX controls

Mobility in country

Release macroprudential
buffers and provide
regulatory flexibility

Macroprudential
relaxation

Full or partial stay-at-home
orders (movement of
essential workers allowed)

Liquidity assistance

Curfews and shelter-in-place

Closure of public spaces and
events

Increased foreign borrowing
to cover shortfall in
revenues or cover surge in
expenses

Employee wage subsidies

Financial support to
(vulnerable) businesses

Cut or postpone fixed and
variables expenses

Public sector salary
adjustments and wage cuts

However, the evidence on the tradeoff between saving lives and safeguarding livelihoods remains
inconclusive. Kochanczyk & Lipniacki (2021) show that a high death toll correlates with a deep
and long-lasting lockdown, causing a severe economic downturn. Contrary to Cross et al. (2020),
they conclude that the tradeoff between health and wealth is illusionary, and that saving lives and
safeguarding livelihoods are not competing objectives (Kochanczyk & Lipniacki, 2021).
Likewise, Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2020) conclude that a lives-livelihoods tradeoff in the short-run
may not exist if stringency policies are feasible and targeted.
Methodology
This study explores the impact of government stringency controls, residential mobility behaviors,
capital flow management, and emergency (fiscal) liquidity support on the level of international
reserves in Caribbean SITES. More specifically, it describes the case of Aruba, one of the most
tourism-dependent islands in the Caribbean with a significant drop in real output during the
COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 (see Table 1). The aforementioned measures cover public health,
monetary, financial and fiscal interventions that have a hypothesized (negative or positive) impact
on international reserves. This study employs secondary data and includes the following variables
(see Table 3): international reserves, government stringency controls, residential mobility
behaviors, capital controls, and fiscal support. Weekly data was collected for the period between
January 1, 2020 and December 31, 2020, and is limited to a relatively short-run perspective.
To analyze the relationship between government stringency controls and international reserves,
and considering previous studies, multivariate quadratic regression analysis was conducted with
an autoregressive component. More specifically, based on the dynamic (non-linear) character of
stringency controls (Cross et al., 2020; Kochanczyk & Lipniacki, 2021) and the lag effect of initial
levels of international reserves (IMF, 2020), a quadratic function of the government stringency
index (standardized from 0 to 100) was used in addition to a time-lag (t-1) for the stock of
international reserves. All variable data was log transformed. To assess stationarity of the timeseries, ADF tests of unit root were conducted and were found to be significant (ADF = -4.81,
p<.01). To explore the mitigating effect of capital controls and fiscal support, two interaction
components (i.e., capital controls*stringency controls and fiscal support*stringency controls) were
included in the multivariate quadratic autoregressive analysis. To account for the effect of tourism
inflows and lapse of time, these were considered as control variables.

Table 3.Description of main variables.
Variable

Description

Source

International reserves

Net foreign assets of commercial banks and the central bank, excluding
revaluation differences of gold, foreign exchange holdings and security holdings
(Dependent variable).

Central Bank (2021).

Government
stringency controls

Government response and (de jure) stringency controls implemented by the
Government to restrict mobility and maximize social distancing. Measured by the
Government Response Stringency Index (indexed from 0 to 100) consisting of a
composite of different control indicators (e.g., school closures, workplace
closures, public event restrictions, stay at home restrictions, public transport
restrictions, and travel bans) (Independent variable).

Hale et al. (2021), Our World
in Data (2021).

Residential mobility
behaviors

Residential behaviors and (de facto) movement in specific locations. Measured by
the Community Mobility Index (indexed from 0 to 100) that describes the
movement (number of resident’s change) in workplaces, recreational and leisure
spaces, and grocery and retail stores (Independent variable)

Hale et al. (2021), Our World
in Data (2021).

Tourism credits

Foreign exchange earnings (inflow) from the export of tourism services activities
recorded on the current account of the balance of payments (Control variable)

Central Bank (2021).

Capital controls

Capital flow management and foreign exchange restrictions on current and
capital accounts of the balance of payments (Moderating variable).

Central Bank (2021).

Fiscal support

Government emergency liquidity support (from foreign borrowing) to cover
financial assistance and wage subsidies to private sector (employees and
business) (Moderating variable)

Department of Finance,
Government of Aruba (2020),
Central Bank (2021).

Results
The results indicate that during 2020, international reserves remained stable and well-above
minimum reserve thresholds, despite the plunge in tourism arrivals (-64.9 percent YoY) and
tourism credits (-48.1 percent YoY), partially mitigated by the drop in imports of goods and
services (-22.7 percent YoY) (see Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2). The results show that international
reserves averaged Afl. 1,897.1 million, ranging between Afl. 1,749.6 million (minimum) and Afl.
2,136.5 million (maximum). The level of international reserves rose by Afl. 386.9 million (+22
percent). In terms of reserve adequacy, the current account coverage, i.e., total months of imports
of goods and services, increased from 4.9 months to 7.5 months (between January 1, 2020 and
December 31, 2020).
By the second week in March, 2020, Aruba registered its first two COVID-19 cases, and
consequently, the Government of Aruba responded with several stringency measures. These
interventions escalated within two weeks with the announcement of a total lockdown, e.g.,
including stay-at-home orders, curfew announcements, (non-essential) workplace restrictions,
school closures, public event restrictions, and a travel ban. By early April, 2020, the government
stringency index (GSI) increased from 0 to 86.2, averaging 44.1 for the complete year (see Figure
2.3). Conversely, the residential mobility index (RMI) dropped to -65.5 with the escalation of
government stringency controls, albeit with a lag of two weeks, and remained largely negative for
the rest of the year, averaging -20.1 (see Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.1. Developments in international reserves.

Figure 2.2. Tourism and trade developments.

Figure 2.3. Stringency controls and residential
mobility.

Figure 2.4. Waves of COVID-19 contagion.

*The Aruban florin is pegged to the US dollar (Afl. 1.79 = US$ 1.00).

After three (3) months of national lockdown, the travel ban was (partially) lifted in July, 2020.
Consequently, the GSI fell in tandem with an upturn of the RMI as mobility increased. However,
within three weeks after the reopening of the borders and the de-escalation of some stringency
controls, there was significant surge in COVID-19 cases (p<.05). By October, 2020, this second
wave resulted in at least 4000 registered total cases. Although stringency controls re-escalated
during this period, residential mobility behaviors did not change significantly (p>.05). The
evidence suggests that although stringency controls and residential mobility behaviors are two
sides (de jure and de facto) of the same intervention phenomenon, their relatively independent
effects, especially after the reopening of the economy, are associated with the increase in total
cases.
In fact, this latter surge is largely explained by residential mobility behaviors (β2= 1.62, R2=.45,
p<.05), with a limited (non-significant) curbing effect of de jure stringency controls (β2= -.59,

R2=.25, p>.05). Beyond a GSI of 41.3 (vertex point), de jure interventions did have, however, a
significant impact on reducing total cases (p<.05).With the COVID-19 pandemic response by the
Government of Aruba and the announcement of a total lockdown and travel ban, the Central Bank
of Aruba (CBA) swiftly eased monetary and macroprudential policies during the third week of
March, 2020. Reserve requirements were lowered from 12 percent to 7 percent, thereby injecting
almost Afl. 200 mln. into the commercial banking sector. From a macroprudential policy
perspective, the minimum capital adequacy ratio was cut (from 16 percent to 14 percent), the
prudential liquidity ratio was lowered (from 18 percent to 15 percent), and the maximum loan-todeposit ratio was increased (from 80 percent to 85 percent) (CBA, 2021). Furthermore, new foreign
exchange licenses for all outgoing capital transactions were suspended as well as restricting certain
current account (outgoing) transactions in order to manage and limit the outflow of foreign
reserves (CBA, 2021).
To absorb the economic losses and adverse labor market impacts, the Government of Aruba
announced a sizeable emergency fiscal package – 15 percent of GDP – by mid-April, 2020 (CBA,
2021). The fiscal package, largely externally financed, entailed minimum income support, partial
wage subsidies, and quarterly liquidity assistance to small businesses, in addition to providing
financial support to the General Health Insurance and the Social Security Bank. Operational
expenditures on goods and services were also cut, however, not merely enough to compensate for
the budget deficit, which reached 18 percent in 2020. The government debt burden surged by 45
percentage points to an estimated 115 percent of GDP, of which more than half (57 percent) is in
the form of foreign debt (CBA, 2021). To finance the deficit, the Government of Aruba resorted
to foreign borrowing and sought emergency fiscal assistance (liquidity support) from the Kingdom
of the Netherlands. In 2020, the Netherlands offered liquidity support in the form of conditioned,
2-year interest-free loans, amounting to 9 percent of GDP (US$230 million). Additionally, the
Government of Aruba borrowed on the international market to finance its pre-existing debt
servicing and liquidity needs to the sum of almost US$250 million (10 percent of GDP).
The results show that government stringency controls have a curve-linear impact on international
reserves, with a significant positively moderating effect from capital controls and liquidity support,
in addition to reduction in consumption and imports. The analysis confirms that government
stringency controls had a dynamic (non-linear) effect on international reserves (β2=-1.23, p<.001,
R2=.46). More specifically, the concave relationship shows an optimum government stringency
index point (i.e., the vertex) of 42.9, after which there is a significant negative association between
GSI and international reserves.
Conclusion and Discussion
Caribbean SITES have been profoundly struck by the COVID-19 pandemic and the rippling effects
that followed – and still continue – in its aftermath. In the case of Aruba, despite being one of the
hardest hit SITES in terms of both economic contraction and COVID-19 cases, it fared relatively
well in monetary and financial terms, albeit causing significant surge in pandemic-driven
government debt. Although the results are limited to a single case study, the initial findings yield
several policy insights, and hold important implications for policy makers and future research.
The findings show that government stringency controls have a dynamic effect on internal reserves.
In the specific case of Aruba, the results reveal that there is an optimum bandwidth or critical

threshold for government stringency controls that ranges between a GSI of 41 and 44 index points.
Rather than a trade-off, the results reveal that safeguarding lives and livelihoods is a prudent
balancing act of managing and adapting policy controls and interventions, contingent on both
health safety and financial stability considerations.
Continuous (re-)adjustment and (re-)alignment of policy controls are pivotal to economic
resilience. In order to maintain adequate reserve levels, the swift and coordinated execution of
health, monetary, FX, macroprudential, financial and fiscal policy measures is quintessential in
both absorbing economic losses as well as mitigating the adverse effects of these losses. Hereto,
accommodative monetary and macroprudential, as well as supportive fiscal policies are key to
maintaining financial stability and health safety in the short run. More importantly, the findings of
this study underscore the importance of maintaining (pre-crisis) and managing (post-shock)
adequate international reserve buffers to strengthen monetary stability and macroeconomic
resilience, especially in times of crisis.
The results suggest that, in addition to effective reserve management, a sound and holistic
macroeconomic tourism policy framework are quintessential to regenerative tourism and
strengthening small island tourism economic resilience. More specifically, strengthening foreign
reserves and (re-)building fiscal space, i.e., fiscal consolidation for debt sustainability is integral
to post-pandemic economic stability. In the case of Aruba and many other Caribbean SITES, the
post-pandemic debt surged to unsustainable levels, thereby depleting fiscal space and raising fiscal
risks, which are likely to impose significant pressures on international reserves when liquidity
support and loan repayments are due.
Beyond fiscal reforms, structural transformation is critical to foster sustainable and resilient
economic development in a post-pandemic Caribbean. In the specific case of Aruba, this structural
transformation includes, e.g., (renewable) energy reforms, service export diversification, as well
as significant health reforms, and the expansion of digital education and electronic government
infrastructures. Likewise, labour market reforms for safeguarding inclusion and income (equality),
and maximizing mobility, flexibility, and productivity are called for. As many Caribbean SITES
reopen their economies and tourism gradually regains traction, prudence is similarly warranted to
manage the sustainable flow of tourism visitors in order to mitigate past perils and risks of
overtourism. In fact, the COVID-19 pandemic merely exposed the tourism overdependence of
some Caribbean island economies and exacerbated their structural vulnerabilities.
Therefore, akin to the systemic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the required reforms should
be equally systemic and structural. Considering the likely long-run impact of the pandemic and
policy measures, in addition to island idiosyncrasies, it should be recognized there is no ‘quick fix’
or ‘one-size-fits-all’ to regenerative tourism and building small island tourism economic resilience.
In pursuit of economic resilience and wellbeing in a post-pandemic Caribbean, future research is
required to analyze and assess the long-term effects of contextualized government and private
sector reforms, as well as community values and behaviours, in response to the current crisis and
future economic shocks.
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